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Law and secrets
This paper deals with the typical notion of the "secret". However, the paper's title,"new arcana", points to a meaningful conceptual reinterpretation of this old notion.
Sometimes modern concepts are employed in order to understand ancient processes.
In the case of "secrets" the stakes are rather the opposite. Indeed, it is challenging to find a word which is capable of grasping everything that the Latin term arcana does.
A preliminary remark concerns the use of the plural "arcana" instead of the singular "arcanum" (which means hidden, secret) 1 . The plural term better illustrates the range of implications and references that the phenomenon of secrecy implies. The expression "arcana imperii" was coined to imply a secret art of government that imitates the old arcana naturae (secrets of nature). Soon, however, it ended up touching a neutral ground. Indeed only in exceptional circumstances was easy access to secrecy allowed. In the meantime, even tough the free access let public power yield to the glimmer of private expectations, it even occurred on no account. This obfuscation is the result of a sliding back and forth between public and private fields, 1 The Latin term arca means "casket " 1 wherein the word "secret" is seemingly kept at the same distance.The term "arcana imperii", however, reveals its bond to the idea of power 2 .
It is for this reason that the secrecy of arcana defies the warp of law, lying midway between its case in point and its history.
In the following notes I examine a few conventional historical modes of arranging the relationship between law and secrets. More precisely, I will provide an overview of the historical reasons that end up disclosing secrecy within the public room. I ultimately describe how in the ancient world secrecy was at first hidden (in Latin the term used is secretum which means concealed) and then later unveiled 3 . This path and the destiny of democracy seem to overlap if democracy is seen to be a space where secrecy is supposed to be limited in the public sphere and extended in favour of private individuals.
It is helpful to make clear at the outset that I do not deal here with the legal history of arcana. Nonetheless, I attempt to use history in a diachronic sense. While this method implies different things in different places, I use here, with reference to the concept of secrecy, to show the interferences between history of ideas and history of thought 4 . Secrecy becomes the object of public attention when it becomes a tool for society's construction. A word like arcana suggests an entire ensemble of cultural behaviours that in a certain moment become a social issue and disconcert the traditional split between public and private.
The word arcana is more pregnant than "secret" for at least a couple of reasons.
First, it brands itself as belonging to a certain epoch in the history of political thought, while the modern translation into "secret" is adapted to the particular technique of conceptual differentiation 5 of the contemporary legal framework.
Indeed, with respect to secrets, law is able to appropriate a few different models of normative life for its own useIt works on a field where a secret is able to Second, it lets us explore power's progressive lack of visibility as a strategy of control.
This second point shapes my arguments in two different ways: first , it suggests the consistency of secrecy seen from a historical perspective; second it points to secrecy's history of adaptation tolegal concepts. With respect to the first point, it is important to determine when it is possible to start talking about the emergence of relationships between public and private in terms of secrecy. Concerning the latter point, it is significant that the concept of secrecy, as a form social praxis, was carved out from beyond the confines of the legal field. In other words, secrecy seems to be present within all social systems but in such a way that it is embodied in different categories.
Thus, it becomes quite clear that secrets are intimately linked to their own time. They act like "social facts", to borrow an idea formulated by John Searle 6 .
From this perspective, it is my aim to single out a few relevant periods wherein the assets of secrecy among public powers and individual rights have shifted. Achieving this aim with respect to the public/private dichotomy, requires an archaeological inquiry of various procedures of communication and decision making.
Along the way, I will highlight several key questions in the hopes of giving some voice to the hidden soul of secrets.
Old" arcana imperii"
The first model is that of arcana in the ancient world. Here the importance of secrets depends on how close society is to its structures. In comparison, the modern world is characterized by an important difference in its multiform perspective of the public/private dichotomy. It is crucial, for instance, that in Roman law the idea of the 6 See John Searle, The Construction of Social Reality, 120-124 (1995)   3 State has been shaped, basically, as a centre of private rights' allocation. Public law seems to be the sum of private experiences; it has no autonomy. Two consequences follow from this assumption: i) a concept of the State has not been framed; ii) the public sphere is constituted by populus romanus, which has inborn private rights 7 .
Moreover, when the princeps replaces the populus, the institutionalisation of power acquires a personal basis through the attribution of private rights to the State.
The Roman Empire was a personal empire, where the prince could recognize himself, and citizens were nothing but subjects to the power of prince 8 . Indeed, during the republican age, the res publica was the centre of the king's property where, nonetheless, the king was supposed to represent the corporate interests. Within this scenario secrets increase considerably, and they develop in a fragmentary way where the boundaries between the public and the private sphere become indefinite.
In the Roman world, for instance, the place of power gathers prominence: auditorium and consistorium are the places of collective life. This example suggests that knowledge is increasing attached to the power of technique (technè). In these places people stand; Augustus is the only one who sits. This example, illustrates the fact that knowledge always implies a high award to those who can be tempted to cross forbidden thresholds.
The other place of decision-making is the secretarium. Here access is not allowed and the judge is kept hidden from indiscreet eyes. This indicates the erosion of the idea of public participation and, in its place, the emergence of with the paradigm of "justice administration". It is reminiscent of the concept of "taking possession of space". The property of contingent, the interest involved imposes itself as an instrument of enforcement (instrumentum regni).
Regardless, there is no doubt that in the Roman world, in spite of the fact that the concept of secrecy was well rooted in the social conscience and widely transposed into legal language, secrecy itself had no normative regulation. Moreover, secrecy was always present in every dimension of daily life, but it was present, paradoxically, Tables. Indeed, after they were compiled, they needed to be interpreted and debated in front of the tribunal. Both, this activity and the knowledge of the formula, suggested a specific competence which was reserved for the pontiffs. Only they knew, for example, the days that were available for the commencement of legal proceedings, the so called fasti. After his discovery of the archive, Gnaeus Flavius swore off writing 11 .
This short tale is significant at least in one respect: the activity of writing locks the archive of knowledge 12 . A political act in defence of free access to law was farsighted, but it implied many consequences.
First of all, jurisprudence lost value because it was easier to enforce the public written formula, which was no longer kept secret. Secondly, the risk of losing a case due to "breach of formula" was escaped.
This story is linked to the use of secrecy in the legal framework. More than likely, the core of the whole conceptual problem of secrecy in the ancient world was the invisibility of formula. I properly refer to the link between actio and exceptio within the ancient trial. The Romans discovered a formula in order to present the "exception" (plea), which laid on the borderline of the law because it was excluded by the ius civile. Indeed the sentence proceeded from what defendants did not plead 13 . In this sense, the exceptio showed the contradiction between the ius civile and the ius honorarium.
The exceptio, in other words, shifted the boundary between the inside and the outside of law, or better yet, between its visibility and its implied existence 14 .
An It is not surprising that the discussion of secrets interweaves with the red thread of the constitutional tradition of subjective rights. Secrets, within this formulation, have seemingly been built in the gaps between rules.
So, the the legal subject is born and moulded in a space that is seemingly free from power. Nevertheless, the modern subject is chargeable with rights, and as a result, the subject must acquire his for himself rights in order to be free. Thus, the absence of law exists as a silent voice that appears sometimes like an obligation to be born, and sometimes like a right to be defended.
However, one of the most important manifestations in the development of subjective rights, is the rise of the Franciscan rule. It represents a rights waiver and the triumph of individualism over property. This thesis has its roots in the perspective Ockham, for whom the subjective right is the endowment of individuals with a legal share in power 23 . On the basis of a modern reading framed by Niklas Luhmann, the problem is that the protection of rights is enforceable on legal grounds, but only with a great deal of abstraction 24 .
More precisely, this problem symbolises the legal bind insofar it is the result of the whereby individuals grasp the world by giving names to things. Rights, in this case, are a good example 26 . The background of such an assumption, the "unknown" of the world (H. Blumenberg's "Unbekannt"), can easily be related to the idea of arcanum.
The "secret" steers the language from within. As long as the "secret" of language progressively comes to light, then the secrecy acquires historical perspective and becomes a language of secrets. Thus progressively the connection between names and things looses its strength. The legal framework reaches the top of the mystic language when it makes use of a typical form of speech act, when it confirms and enforces a previous linguistic sentence 27 . A lack of correspondence requires that the whole language be thought like a name by a particular kind of speech act, the oath 28 .At that moment the history of oath was forever bound to the history of the Western world. It acts as a warranty of language's power 29 ; and its important trace continues to follow the legal tradition 30 .
From" arcana" to the "raison d'État"
The irruption of secrets into language flows into two further models that are of semantic importance. The first comes from the medieval outline of arcana dei and arcana imperii, found in the theory of " "dogma" of political embodiment, and it was lived as an invisible entity through the ruse of an impersonal institution: the crown.
The breach of the oath, for instance, was a crime contra personam vel coronam (that is against the corpus mysticum and the corpus ecclesiae iuridicum). The office turned into the fiction of persona ficta. Thus, the deathless quality of the king was in its dignity, notits office. The king simultaneously possessed both a mortal and an artificial character. In this double transition that the oath enacts, the corporative quality of royal dignity was represented by the continuity between the successor and the predecessor. In this perspective, the corpus mysticum had two different meanings:
first, it was a visible corpus of the Church and an invisible liturgical sphere; second, it established a link to the idea of the sacred Empire as the social corpus of the Church. The metaphor of the State of emergency consists of these two meanings of corpus mysticum . The government was considered to be both a mysterium of sorts and something like the sacred ministerium of justice 32 . This paradox is founded on the progressive severance of the divine body from the human body. On the other hand, this fiction found its cause and its aim in a typical technique of partage between person and office.
The question became the following: how is it possible to build the public persona of the king? 33 This question rested atop the basic assumption that it was not possible to ascribe the full entirety of fiscus to the king or the community. The problem seems to have warranted the rise of perpetua necessitas: the State could be omnipresent only through yearly taxation. The fiscus was, indeed, an impersonal entity, and as such it needed to referr not to another mortal being, but rather to the crown. Consequently, the goods that constitute the fiscus 34 could not be sold or transferred by the king because they represent the very things that the crown is supposed to preserve and increase: peace and justice (roughly equivalent to the modern concept of common goods). Because God and fiscus never die, they ensure an eternal public sphere of rule. They ensure the renewal of dynastic continuity, the corporation of crown and 34 The res quasi sacrae stand for the fiscalia and were distinguished by the patrimonialia.
9 the immortality of social dignity. The immaterial features of the king persisted above and beyond his life through mandatory acts whose procedural elements strengthened their force 35 .
The fictitious character of the king's bodyrepresents the first un-differentiation between king and society that will later lead to the theory of the social contract. Two distinct bodies emerge: one from nature, the other from the political order.
As a side note, Yan Thomas' examination of the regime of public goods during the Middle Age offers a nuanced interpretation of the sujet de droit 36 . He subtly observes that personification was used to ascribe rights, rather than to protect goods 37 . These "The contradictory multiplicity of law' identities and the founding paradox of law are both to be found hidden behind the facade of law's hierarchy at the top of which the king's Two Bodies are governing law's empire. The constitutional law construction of the political democratic sovereign as the top layer of law's hierarchy has allowed the law to externalize its threatening paradox and to hand it over to paradox where it is "resolved" by democracy". 36 is not by chance that this happens within public law, because the enforcement of law through the enforceability of the oath is a public act. The secret becomes a means of social organisation because the "subject of law" constitutes "man" 45 . By secret agreements all that is arranged by contract is subsequently allowed to be slipped out. Under the veil of the authority of the State, private feelings are deprived of political effects. They are suppressed through the control of conscience, something that is impossible to judge outside oneself.
The Mannerist idea of "raison d'État" is founded on "the secret of policy making".
The Therefore, during the second half of sixteenth century, the main difference between IV, 35 (1933) to the "location of fear" 49 . It is interesting that this distinction exists in politics but not constitutional history 50 .
Why is the distinction limited to the domain of politics?
The first reason is that politics is held to exist as though it were a pure fact where values can no longer play an independent role. The sole acknowledged value could only be achieved through obedience, the mere act of observing the king's will.
Moreover, according to this theory, Mannerism seems to be the historical situation where instability and variability begin to gain clarity, a clarification that is achieved by turning against all that is conformist. Thus, this same process implies the elevation of individualism. In any case, it was born as an undifferentiated movement against "anti-state conformism" 51 . Better, it has been drawn up like an élite theory of unconformity, the initial assumption of which rests on the task of revealing the secret "irregular harmony" contained within the unity of contradictions.
It is not the case, indeed, that the spokesmen of that élite were the king's advisers. History, therefore, becomes a legal process when the connection between sin and accountability is broken. The king remains without blame but he is responsible for the entire community , whereas the 'subject' has a double sin, both in private (in relation to the other subjects) and in public (in relation to the king).
Is in this gap between a blameless king and doubly sinful subjects that secrets start lurking in the communication between public and private. This is no longer a case of the secrets' art of arcana imperii. Here we are dealing with the "secrets' science of If an individual claims to be vested with a prerogative that the State reserves for itself, he has to disguise his action. The result is the necessity to negotiate the tension between the desire for power ex parte principis and the desire for the compensation that is offered in exchange for observing rules ex parte populi 63 .
The close alliance between the law and the king encourages the pursuit of frauds under the cover of high ideals. Thus, the king could change the law according to the circumstances. Tacitus talked about "simulacra imperii seu libertatis" calling them the ghosts of rights and liberties that reward subjects for what they have lost. The king shows tolerance, so long as his power remains unaffected 64 .
The dissimulation of secrets: the public use of speech
Nevertheless, during the Enlightenment -the fourth model examined here -the secret loses its moral and social meaning and takes on an intellectual one 65 . The slogan of the Enlightenment becomes the "public use of reason" 66 . This remark of Kant's refers to the use of public reason by a learned man in front of an audience of readers. The postulate of publicity consists in this: the use of reason must be free at every moment, it must be without limit, and only it represents the vehicle of the Enlightenment of men. On the other hand, the private use of reason was confined to the civil role in which a person was engaged; and the private use of reason could occasionally be limited without hindering the progress of Enlightenment 67 . From Kant's perspective, the public use of reason has nothing to do with the duty of obedience; it cannot, in other words forbid the obedience of laws. In short, men are allowed to speak freely as intellectuals in front of a public 68 .
